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1. Introduction 
The resolution of a distressed international bank is potentially plagued by a conflict of 
interest about international burden sharing among national authorities, which often makes it an 
uncertain and costly process. This can also make the financial safety net coverage of international 
banks less certain compared to domestic banks, possibly increasing their funding costs. In this 
paper we examine if a bank’s funding costs are associated with its degree of internationalization 
and whether this reflects international banks’ differential access to the financial safety net.  
Using bank-level data for 84 countries over the 1999-2009 period, we show that a bank’s 
cost of funds rises significantly with its internationalization. Specifically, banks with a higher share 
of foreign liabilities in overall liabilities pay higher interest expenses, which is consistent with a 
less generous financial safety net coverage for cross-border banks. Moreover, we show that a 
bank’s funding costs decline with a Herfindahl index of liability concentration among the countries 
where it operates. A higher international liability concentration increases the incentives for the 
affected public authorities to provide bailout funding to a distressed bank, thereby potentially 
limiting expected losses for bank liability holders. 
We provide several pieces of evidence that the higher funding costs of international banks 
reflect the less generous safety net support available to them.  Uncertain access to the financial 
safety net is especially damaging for underperforming banks, as these are more likely to require 
safety net support. Confirming this conjecture, we find that a bank’s cost of funds increases with 
its share of foreign liabilities especially if it is not performing well. Similarly, the cost of funds for 
an underperforming bank declines more with the international concentration of its liabilities.  
To further test whether international banks expect less from the financial safety net, we 
split the overall sample into banks headquartered in fiscal-deficit and fiscal-surplus countries. 
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International banks located in countries experiencing fiscal deficits may be able to rely on the 
financial safety net to a lesser extent, since these countries may be unable or unwilling to shoulder 
the cost of bailing out international banks. Indeed, we find that the estimated relationships between 
bank interest expenses and bank internationalization are statistically significant for the fiscal-
deficit sample, but not for the fiscal-surplus sample.  
The strength of the financial safety net protecting banks matters more during economic 
downturns when banks are more likely to become distressed. In line with this, we find that the 
relationship between a bank’s foreign liabilities share and its cost of funds is stronger at times of 
weak world GDP growth, reflecting higher overall economic and financial risks. 
Finally, we acknowledge that a bank’s internationalization decision is potentially 
endogenous to its cost of funds. A bank that is unexpectedly confronted with high interest expenses 
may, for instance, reduce its degree of internationalization as a way to bring its interest expenses 
down. Endogeneity of this kind may dampen our estimated effect of bank internationalization on 
bank interest expenses. To control for this, we apply instrumental variable estimation to our 
interest expense equations, using indices of country-level international economic integration as 
instruments for bank-level internationalization. Our instruments relate to tourism, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), international trade, and international portfolio investment.2 As expected, our 
instrumental variables results show a more positive impact of bank internationalization on bank 
interest expenses. 
Our results suggest that international banks were perceived to have more restricted access 
to the financial safety net, indicating that banks faced a disincentive to internationalize. This 
                                                 
2 This approach is motivated by a literature that explains cross-border banking bilaterally on the basis of FDI, 
international trade, and other determinants (see Grosse and Goldberg (1991), Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), and 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005)). 
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implies economic costs, as the degree of bank internationalization would be inefficiently low.  
However, in a world of inadequate national bank supervision and regulation, and tardy and 
potentially very costly cross-border resolutions, limited bank internationalization may well have 
been beneficial. Looking forward, we think that a first priority is to ensure that there is better 
international coordination of bank regulation and supervision, as well as improved insolvency 
resolution that ensures cross-border burden sharing. Once this is achieved, safety net reforms to 
achieve a uniform treatment of domestic and international banks would be the next step.   
This paper’s findings are consistent with both theoretical and empirical literature on this 
topic. On a theoretical level, Freixas (2003) models the incentives for national governments to 
contribute towards the costs of recapitalizing a distressed international bank. Contributing to this 
cost is an international public good. Underprovision of this public good may result in liquidation 
of the bank in equilibrium, despite the fact that the aggregate international benefits of 
recapitalization exceed its cost. The prospect of inefficient bank liquidations of international 
banks, as modeled by Freixas (2003), could lead to a higher cost of funds for such banks.  
Anecdotal evidence from the recent financial crisis also suggests that bank 
internationalization reduced ex post credit recovery for the bank’s liability holders. Claessens et 
al. (2010, p. 45), in particular, describe how unilateral action of US regulators in the Lehman 
bankruptcy in 2008 made it almost impossible to salvage much value out of the firm’s international 
operations, implying larger losses to Lehman’s liability holders. Furthermore, in 2008 Iceland 
reneged on the deposit insurance provided to foreign depositors when its banking system 
collapsed. 
A few empirical papers report results that are consistent with a weaker financial safety net 
for internationalized banks. Ongena and Penas (2009) find that bondholders experience relatively 
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low abnormal returns in cross-border bank mergers, possibly reflecting the expectation of a less 
generous financial safety net treatment of international banks. Furthermore, Beck et al. (2013) find 
that the CDS spreads of distressed internationalized banks are relatively high at the time of 
regulatory intervention. This could reflect that the liability holders of international banks expect 
larger losses at the time of regulatory intervention, consistent with a weaker financial safety net 
for international banks. Our paper contributes to this emerging literature by providing evidence 
that greater bank internationalization is associated with higher funding costs reflecting a less 
generous safety-net access for international banks.3  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, and in 
particular our measures of bank internationalization. Section 3 presents the results on the impact 
of bank internationalization on banks’ funding costs. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The data 
In this paper, we examine an international sample of 903 banks located in 84 countries 
focusing on the period 1999-2009. Income statement and balance sheet information on individual 
banks are obtained from the Bankscope database. In addition, Bankscope provides ownership data 
that we use to match parent banks with directly owned subsidiary banks.4 To ensure data quality, 
we only consider parent banks that are publicly listed. 
Of the 903 banks in the sample, around one third have at least one foreign subsidiary. We 
construct two indices of bank internationalization for parent banks. First, we measure 
internationalization by the extent to which a bank’s liabilities are foreign. Banks with large foreign 
                                                 
3 Previous literature on the market discipline of banks includes Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Sironi (2003), and 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004). 
4 Bankscope does not provide information on foreign branches. 
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liabilities are potentially less likely to receive generous bailout benefits. We focus on bank 
liabilities, as these are commensurate to the potential size of bank bailouts. The foreign liabilities 
share variable is constructed as the ratio of the sum of all foreign subsidiaries’ liabilities (weighted 
by the parent bank’s ownership share) to the consolidated liabilities of the parent firm. As reported 
in Table 1, the mean value of the foreign liabilities share is 2.0% for the sample of all banks, and 
it is around 5.7% for the sample of banks that have at least one foreign subsidiary.5 Figure 1 plots 
the distribution of the foreign liabilities share for banks with at least one foreign subsidiary. Among 
these banks, 55.5% have a foreign liabilities share of less than 2.5%.  
As an alternative internationalization measure, we consider a Herfindahl index of the 
concentration of the overall bank’s liabilities in the countries where the bank operates. A bank 
with highly concentrated liabilities can expect higher bailout benefits, as there is less of a free-
rider problem among the countries that potentially need to bail out the bank. The concentration 
variable is constructed as the sum of the squared shares of a bank’s ownership-weighted liabilities 
(relative to the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities) in the countries where it operates. The 
liability share for the parent country is calculated as 1 minus the liability shares for all foreign 
countries. The concentration variable reaches a maximum of one for a purely domestic bank. The 
mean concentration is 0.966, which reflects that most banks have highly concentrated liabilities 
primarily in the domestic country. The minimum concentration is 0.271 for a bank with liabilities 
that are highly dispersed internationally. Figure 2 displays the distribution of the concentration 
variable. The foreign liabilities share and concentration variables are highly negatively correlated 
with a correlation coefficient of -0.966 that is significant at 1%. 
                                                 
5 The calculated value of the foreign liabilities share potentially exceeds 1, as some foreign subsidiaries may have 
internal debt to the parent bank.  
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In the empirical work, we examine whether liability internationalization affects a bank’s 
interest expenses. The interest expense variable is constructed as the ratio of interest expenses to 
total interest-bearing liabilities at the consolidated bank level.6 This variable reflects potential 
stresses at the group level as well as the bank’s overall access to the financial safety net in the 
countries where it operates. The interest expense variable is positively (negatively) correlated with 
the foreign liabilities share (concentration) variable, consistent with a weaker financial safety net 
for internationalized banks. 
In the presence of strong market discipline, we expect banks with a higher default risk to 
pay higher interests. Underperforming banks are especially risky. Thus, our main index of failure 
risk is a bank’s profitability rate, constructed as the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. 
Alternatively, we consider a bank’s Z-score constructed as the sum of a bank’s return on assets 
and its capital-to-assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (and by the 
log of total assets to normalize for bank size). In addition, we consider an index of bank asset risk. 
Specifically, bank asset volatility is the delevered standard deviation of bank stock returns, or more 
precisely the annualized standard deviation of bank stock returns multiplied by the ratio of the 
market value of common equity to the imputed market value of assets (see Nikolova, 2003).  
The empirical work includes several bank-level and country-level control variables. Banks 
that are large may face lower interest expenses on account of being too-big-to-fail (TBTF), or 
alternatively pay higher interest rates if they are too-big-to-save (TBTS). To control for a bank’s 
absolute size, we include the assets variable, constructed as the log of total bank assets. 
Alternatively, the TBTF variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s liabilities are 
larger than the 90th percentile of the sample. To reflect a bank’s size relative to the national 
                                                 
6 Our data source does not allow us to split interest expenses into interest paid on deposits and on other liabilities.   
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economy, we construct the TBTS variable as a dummy variable that equals one if the ratio of a 
bank’s liabilities to GDP exceeds the 90th percentile (or a liabilities-to-GDP ratio of 30.4%).7  
The overhead variable is constructed as the ratio of personnel and other non-interest 
expenses to total assets. Several additional variables reflect a bank’s funding strategy. The short-
term debt variable is computed as short-term debt divided by total interest-bearing liabilities. The 
tier1 capital ratio, computed as tier1 capital relative to risk-weighted assets. The deposit funding 
variable is the share of deposits in total liabilities. Deposit funding may lead to lower funding 
costs, as deposits tend to be protected by deposit insurance. 
Macroeconomic control variables are the parent country’s consumer price inflation, growth 
rate of real GDP per capita, and GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. A bank’s 
average worldwide funding costs can be expected to reflect inflation in the parent country as well 
as in other countries where the bank operates to the extent that it attracts funding in these other 
countries. To reflect this, we construct the inflation difference variable as the average foreign 
inflation rate weighted by the bank’s country-level foreign liabilities minus the inflation rate in the 
parent country. 
Finally, there are four indices of country-level economic integration that we use as 
instruments for bank-level internationalization. First, tourism is the total number of tourist arrivals 
in and departures from a country normalized by its population. Second, FDI stands for foreign 
direct investments flows, both inward and outward, relative to GDP. Third, openness is the sum of 
exports and imports over GDP. Fourth, portfolio position stands for the stocks of inward and 
outward portfolio investments of a country divided by its GDP.  
                                                 
7 Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) find that a bank’s market-to-book value is negatively related to the size of its 
liabilities-to-GDP ratio, which suggests that banks with large liabilities relative to GDP can be too large to save. 
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3. Empirical results on bank internationalization and interest expenses 
3.1 Basic empirical results   
Empirically, we relate a bank’s interest expenses to its foreign liabilities share, or to its 
foreign liability concentration, as alternative indices of bank internationalization. The basic 
estimating relationship between interest expenses and the bank’s foreign liabilities share is as 
follows:  
Interest expenseijt = αi + γt + β1Foreign liabilities shareijt +  
 β2 Profitijt-1 * Foreign liabilities shareijt +  β3 Bankijt + β4 Countryjt + εijt 
where the subscripts i, j, and t denote the bank, the country, and the year, and  αi  and  γt are bank 
and year fixed effects. Further, Bankijt is a set of bank variables including lagged bank profitability, 
and Countryjt is a set of macroeconomic variables.  
The coefficient β1 reflects the effect of the foreign liabilities share on interest expenses. We 
expect a negative sign on the coefficient β1 since a high foreign liabilities share potentially reduces 
a bank’s access to the financial safety net, increasing its default risk, and therefore also its interest 
expenses. The coefficient β2 captures whether the relationship between interest expenses and a 
bank’s foreign liabilities share depends on its performance, as proxied by the lagged bank 
profitability variable. A negative estimated coefficient β2 would indicate that bank interest 
expenses rise relatively more with the foreign liabilities share for underperforming banks. Banks 
with low profitability stand a greater chance of bank distress and are more likely to access the 
financial safety net. Hence, a negative value of β2 is consistent with the view that the estimated 
relationship between bank interest expenses and the foreign liabilities share reflects the ability of 
the banks to rely on the financial safety net. In a robustness check, we replace the bank’s profit 
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variable by the growth rate of world GDP per capita to proxy for general economic and financial 
conditions. 
Table 2 reports interest expense regressions including either the foreign liabilities share or 
concentration as an index of bank liability internationalization. The regressions include bank and 
year fixed effects, and robust standard errors are reported. Regression 1 includes the foreign 
liabilities share without its interaction with profitability. The estimated coefficient for the foreign 
liabilities share is positive at 0.021 and significant at 5%. Regression 2 adds the interaction of the 
foreign liabilities share and profitability variables, yielding positive and negative coefficients for 
the foreign liabilities share variable and its interaction with profitability that are significant at 5% 
and 10%, respectively. These results suggest that interest expenses rise with the foreign liabilities 
share, and especially for banks with low profitability. This evidence is consistent with the notion 
that international banks, and especially underperforming ones, rely less on the financial safety net. 
In regressions 3 and 4 we substitute the concentration variable for the foreign liabilities 
share in regressions 1 and 2. In both regressions, the concentration variable obtains a negative and 
significant coefficient, while the interaction of the concentration and profitability variables obtains 
a positive and significant coefficient in regression 4. This is again consistent with a reduced access 
to the financial safety net for internationalized banks, especially if they are underperforming.8  
In regressions 5-8, we add several bank-level control variables to the earlier specifications 
1-4. The additional control variables are: lagged asset volatility as an index of bank asset risk, the 
lagged tier1 ratio as a regulatory capital ratio, and deposit funding to represent the extent of bank 
                                                 
8 In a robustness check, we adjust the interest expense variable for the 3-months interbank interest rate available from 
the OECD. In unreported regressions analogous to regressions 1-4 of Table 2, the foreign liabilities share 
(concentration) variables obtain positive (negative) coefficients that are statistically significant, but the interactions of 
these variables with the profit variable are no longer significant. 
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funding obtained through deposits. The lagged tier1 ratio enters these regressions with negative 
and significant coefficients, which suggest that better capitalized banks have lower funding costs. 
Notably, we find that our results indicating a diminished strength of the financial safety net for 
internationalized banks are robust to including a larger set of control variables.  
In summary, the results in Table 2 suggest that internationalized banks have significantly 
higher interest costs. In addition, there is evidence that underperforming international banks face 
even higher interest expenses, consistent with a greater probability that these banks need to access 
the financial safety net.  
3.2 Robustness checks 
This subsection presents the results of several robustness checks. To start, regressions 1 
and 2 of Table 3 add the inflation difference variable interacted with the foreign liabilities share 
variable to regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 to control for the potentially different inflationary 
environment that an international bank faces abroad. We expect this interaction variable to obtain 
positive coefficients as higher inflation abroad may result in higher foreign nominal interest rates. 
Indeed, in regressions 1 and 2 the Inflation difference*Foreign liabilities share variable obtains 
positive and significant coefficients.  Importantly, controlling for this effect does not change the 
main results significantly. 
The estimated coefficients of regression 2 in Table 3 can be used to evaluate the economic 
significance of the estimated relationship between a bank’s interest expense ratio and its foreign 
liabilities share. A one standard deviation increase in the foreign liabilities share of 0.068 
(evaluated at a mean profitability of 0.013, and a mean inflation difference of -0.007 from Table 
1) is estimated to increase the interest expense ratio by 0.0008 or 0.08 % [=(0.026+(-
0.875*0.013)+(0.400*(-0.007)))*0.068]. This is equivalent to a share of 0.0008/0.024, or 3.3%, of 
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the standard deviation of the interest variable, which is 0.024 from Table 1. Thus, variation in the 
foreign liabilities share can explain only a small part of the variation in bank interest expenses. 
This is not surprising, as most banks in the sample are purely domestic and even most international 
banks have predominantly domestic liabilities. 
Perhaps a more meaningful way to assess the impact of liability internationalization on 
interest costs is to compare the cost of funds for an internationalized bank to the domestic cost of 
funds for a similar, purely domestic bank. In the odd numbered regressions in Tables 2 and 3, we 
obtain significant coefficients for the linear foreign liabilities share variable that range from 0.012 
to 0.021. This suggests that the (marginal) cost of foreign liabilities is between 1.2% and 2.1% 
higher than the cost of funds for a purely domestic bank, which is a material difference given an 
overall mean interest expense of 3.3% from Table 1. 
By implication, the interest expense ratio is estimated to be between 7 and 12 basis points 
higher for the average internationalized bank with a foreign liabilities share of 5.7% compared to 
a purely domestic bank. Using ratings information, Ueda and di Mauro (2010) previously 
estimated that banks in G20 countries and in Spain and Switzerland received interest subsidies 
from the financial safety net in the range of 10-50 basis points in 2007. These various estimates 
together suggest that banks around the world receive a net subsidy from the financial safety net 
even if this subsidy is lower for international banks.  
Next, regressions 3 and 4 of Table 3 include the TBTF and TBTS variables as additional 
measures of a bank’s absolute size and its size relative to GDP to proxy for a bank’s potential too-
big-to-fail or too-big-to-save status. The TBTF variable receives positive but insignificant 
coefficients, while the TBTS variable is estimated with positive and significant coefficients in both 
regressions. The latter results suggest that banks that are large relative to their national economies 
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may be too large to save. In these regressions, estimated coefficients for the foreign liabilities share 
and its interaction with lagged profit are very similar to those in regressions 1 and 2.  
In regressions 5 and 6, we replace the lagged profit variable as a proxy for bank risk by the 
Z-score, yielding coefficients for the foreign liabilities share that are largely unchanged.9 The Z-
score variable and its interaction with the foreign liabilities share variable obtain insignificant 
coefficients, perhaps reflecting the reduced sample size. Overall, the results in Table 3 confirm a 
positive estimated relationship between the foreign liabilities share and the interest expense ratio. 
Next, we investigate the plausibility of the financial safety net explanation by examining 
how the relationship between bank interest expenses and liability internationalization depends on 
the fiscal strength of the bank’s parent country. Fiscal problems may raise doubts on the 
government’s capacity and willingness to carry out expensive international bank bailouts, 
particularly for international banks. Therefore, bank interest expenses are expected to vary 
positively with bank liability internationalization especially in countries that run central 
government fiscal deficits. To check this, columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the results of interest 
expense regressions including either the foreign liabilities share or the concentration variables for 
the sample of only fiscal-surplus observations, while columns 3 and 4 show the results of 
analogous regressions for only fiscal-deficit observations. For the fiscal-surplus sample, the 
foreign liabilities share variable in regression 1 and the concentration variable in regression 2 
obtain coefficients that are statistically insignificant. Alternatively, for the fiscal-deficit sample the 
corresponding estimated coefficients are 0.032 and significant at 1% in regression 3, and -0.026 
and significant at 1% in regression 4. Moreover, these estimated coefficients are larger in absolute 
                                                 
9 Similar results are obtained if we use the standard deviation of the return on equity as a bank risk variable 
(unreported). 
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value than the corresponding estimates in regression 1 of Table 3 and regression 3 of Table 2. 
These results suggest that the relationships between funding costs and measures of 
internationalization are stronger for banks from fiscal-deficit countries than for the overall sample. 
Notably, there is no such relationship for fiscal-surplus countries’ banks. This is evidence that the 
empirical relationship between interest expenses and bank liability internationalization reflects a 
reduced ability to rely on the financial safety net for internationalized banks. 
Finally, we test whether the relationship between a bank’s overall interest expenses and its 
foreign liabilities share depends on the world business cycle. We include an interaction variable 
of the foreign liabilities share with the growth rate of world GDP per capita – replacing the 
interaction of the foreign liabilities share with lagged profit. The results are reported as regressions 
5 and 6 in Table 4 for the full sample and for the sample excluding outliers where the foreign 
liabilities share exceeds 0.3 (as seen in Figure 1), respectively. The included interaction term is 
negative in both regressions, but statistically significant (at 5%) only in regression 6. The negative 
estimated coefficient for the interaction term in regression 6 indicates that internationalized banks 
face higher interest expenses especially at times of slow world economic growth. This suggests 
that the liabilities of international banks are considered relatively risky at times of economic and 
financial downturns confirming the view that international banks expect to rely less on the 
financial safety net.  
3.3 Endogeneity issues    
Our results so far suggest that bank internationalization leads to higher interest expenses. 
This implies that an international bank confronted with high interest expenses may reduce these 
by lowering its degree of internationalization. Thus, higher interest expenses may trigger a 
reduction in internationalization, making internationalization endogenous to interest expenses. 
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Endogeneity of this kind may lead to a downward bias (in absolute terms) of the estimated impact 
of our internationalization measures on interest expenses. To address this endogeneity, we estimate 
IV regressions where we use indices of international economic integration at the country level to 
instrument for bank-level internationalization. Measures of country-level economic integration 
should be positively correlated with measures of bank-level internationalization, but they are 
unlikely to be affected by the level of bank interest expenses. Hence, they are likely to be 
appropriate instruments. 
As instruments, we use four measures of country-level international economic integration: 
the number of tourist arrivals and departures over total population, the sum of inward and outward 
FDI over GDP, exports plus imports over GDP, and the sum of portfolio-investment assets and 
liabilities over GDP. In the estimation, we use a bank fixed-effects model with two-step GMM 
estimation with robust standard errors.  All the instruments are expected to have a positive 
(negative) impact on the foreign liabilities share (the foreign liability concentration), as banks in 
internationally integrated economies should internationalize their funding more (and concentrate 
it less). The estimated coefficients from the first-stage regressions provided in Table 5 tend to 
confirm this expectation, as the instruments generally obtain positive signs in the first-stage foreign 
liabilities share regressions 1 and 2 (and negative signs in the concentration regressions 3 and 4). 
Tourism as an instrument is significant in all 4 first-stage regressions in Table 5, while FDI is 
significant in regressions 1 and 3 that do not include an interaction term of the included 
internationalization variable and profit. The joint significance tests for excluded instruments are 
rejected for all regressions at least at the 5% level, with p-values presented in the table. The first-
stage regressions for the interaction terms of an internationalization variable with profit also 
perform well (not reported). Underidentification does not seem to be a problem, as all regressions 
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in the table pass underidentification tests with at least 10% significance – except the last regression 
with a p-value 0.11. 
Our instruments reflect country-level economic integration, and there is no obvious reason 
why they should affect bank-level interest expenses other than through bank-level 
internationalization. Indeed, our instruments do not significantly affect interest expenses when 
included in baseline regressions. We report the results of overidentifying restrictions tests in the 
form of Hansen J-tests for our efficient GMM estimation. The results indicate that the 
overidentifying restrictions tests are met in all regressions.  
In the second-stage interest expense regressions 1 and 2, the foreign liabilities share is 
estimated with coefficients of 0.094 and 0.155 that are significant at the 5% level. These estimated 
coefficients are higher than the corresponding coefficients in Table 3, which suggest a downward 
bias in our earlier estimation. In regression 3, the concentration variable enters with a negative 
coefficient of -0.082 that is significant at 1%, and more negative than the analogous estimate in 
regression 3 of Table 2 confirming downward bias in the OLS estimation. Coefficients for the 
interactions of the included internationalization variable and profit are estimated to be statistically 
insignificant in Table 5. Overall, the IV estimation in Table 5 confirms our results that bank 
internationalization causes higher bank interest expenses, consistent with the perception of a more 
fragile financial safety net for internationalized banks. 
3.4 The global financial crisis and the post-crisis period     
In this subsection, we examine whether the relationship between interest expenses and bank 
internationalization was different during the crisis years 2007-2009, and during the post-crisis 
period 2010-2013. 
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To see whether perceptions of financial safety net strength were different during the crisis, 
we add interactions of a crisis dummy variable representing the years 2007-2009 with all right-
hand-side variable to regressions 1-4 of Table 2. The results are reported in Table 6. In regression 
4, only the concentration variable and its interaction with the crisis variable obtain negative and 
significant coefficients, suggesting that liability concentration gave rise to lower interest expenses 
especially during the crisis. In the table, all other double and triple interactions terms involving 
crisis and either foreign liabilities share or concentration are statistically insignificant, while the 
foreign liabilities share and concentration measures themselves are significant (except in 
regressions 3 and 5). Overall, these results suggest that the relationship between bank liability 
internationalization and interest expenses was not significantly changed during the global financial 
crisis.  
During the crisis, many countries provided extensive public support to domestic as well as 
internationally active banks. As a result, the experience of the crisis may have strengthened 
perceptions of the relative reliability of the financial safety net available to international banks 
compared to domestic banks. In addition, the more recent period was characterized by the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012 which triggered extraordinary policy responses from 
the European Central Bank. These events may have changed the internationalization-interest 
expense relationship we observed before the crisis.  
To examine this, we re-estimate regressions 1-4 of Table 2 for a sample that includes the 
post-crisis years 2010-2013, and report the results as regressions 1-4 in Table 7. For the extended 
sample, coefficients for the included internationalization variables and their interactions with 
profitability are statistically significant with the exception of the concentration variable in 
regression 3. Estimated coefficients tend to be smaller in absolute value than in Table 2.  In 
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specifications 5-8 we add interactions of a post-crisis dummy variable with bank 
internationalization variables. The signs of the coefficients for the interactions of 
internationalization variables with the post-crisis dummy tend to be consistent with a weaker 
relationship between internationalization and interest expenses in the post-crisis period, but these 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. Overall, the results of Table 7 are suggestive evidence 
that the crisis may have strengthened the perception of the reliability of the financial safety net 
applicable to internationally active banks relative to domestic banks. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that internationalized banks face higher interest expenses.  In 
particular, banks with a higher share of foreign liabilities and a lower international concentration 
of their liabilities pay higher interest on their liabilities. We provide several pieces of evidence 
suggesting that internationalized banks faced higher interest expenses reflecting a more restricted 
access to the financial safety net.  
First, the estimated relationships between bank interest expenses on the one hand and the 
foreign liabilities share and the international liabilities concentration on the other are attenuated 
for highly profitable banks, which are less likely to require access to the financial safety net. 
Second, the empirical relationships between bank interest expenses and our measures of bank 
internationalization are significant only if the country where the parent bank is located is 
experiencing a fiscal deficit, casting some doubt on the country’s ability and willingness to provide 
generous bailout support to its banking system when needed. Third, the interest expense premium 
that international banks pay relative to purely domestic banks is highest at times of weak world 
GDP growth as a proxy for overall economic and financial risks. Finally, our finding that 
19 
 
internationalized banks face higher interest expenses is robust to IV estimation where we use 
indices of country-level economic integration to instrument for bank-level internationalization.  
Having a more restricted access to the financial safety net with internationalization may 
have discouraged banks from becoming more international. This has the disadvantage that the 
potential economic benefits of international banking market integration are less likely to be reaped. 
However, the model of international banking pursued before the global financial crisis was deeply 
flawed in the sense that the institutional infrastructure for international banking was largely 
incomplete.  Specifically, regulation and supervision and the treatment and resolution of weak 
banks were not coordinated, and burden sharing rules in cases of international bank failures were 
unclear. In the absence of adequate international policy integration, having a safety net that extends 
to international activities can actually backfire since it can be a recipe for excessive risk-taking 
and moral hazard. Hence despite its efficiency costs, a more limited safety net for international 
banks may have been appropriate during this period because of its potential stability benefits. More 
uniform access to the financial safety net for domestic and international banks would make sense 
if the two types of banks also receive equal treatment by bank supervisors, and in recovery and 
resolution proceedings.  
One way to bring about equal treatment is to transfer supervisory and resolution powers to 
an international or supranational level. This has to a large extent occurred in Europe where bank 
supervisory powers have recently been transferred to the European Central Bank as the single 
supervisor in the Eurozone, and where the Single Resolution Board has the task of developing 
resolution plans for failing EU banks. We already observe weak evidence that safety net access 
may have become more equal for international banks in the post-crisis period. In future empirical 
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work, it will be possible to determine whether these institutional changes have indeed contributed 
to a more uniform access to the financial safety net for domestic and international banks.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Description Sources 
Foreign liabilities share Sum of the liabilities of foreign subsidiary banks weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided 
by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities 
Bankscope 
Concentration Sum of the squared shares of bank liabilities weighted by the parent bank’s ownership in a country 
relative to the parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all countries where the  parent bank operates 
Bankscope 
Interest expense Interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt Bankscope 
Lagged profit Pre-tax profits divided by assets, lagged one period Bankscope 
Lagged Z-score Index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/stddev(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR 
is ratio of capital to assets, and stddev(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets. It is calculated 
for 4-years rolling windows, normalized by total assets, and lagged one period 
Bankscope 
Lagged asset volatility Bank asset volatility calculated as stddev(R) ∗ (E/V), where stddev(R) is the annualized standard 
deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns, E is the market value of common equity and V 
is the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book value of common 
equity, lagged one period   
Bankscope and  
Datastream 
Assets Log of assets in millions of 2000 US dollars Bankscope and WDI 
TBTF Dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s liabilities in 2000 US dollars are larger than the 90th 
percentile of the sample 
Bankscope 
TBTS Dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s liabilities over GDP is larger than the 90th percentile of the 
sample 
Bankscope and WDI 
Overhead Ratio of personnel and other non-interest expenses to assets Bankscope 
Short-term debt Customer and short-term funding to total interest paying debt Bankscope 
Lagged tier1 ratio Share of tier1 capital in risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks as measured under Basel rules, 
lagged one period  
Bankscope 
Deposit funding  Share of deposit funding in total liabilities.  
Inflation Rate of change in consumer prices WDI 
GDP growth Rate of real per capita GDP growth WDI 
World GDP growth Rate of real per capita GDP growth at global level WDI 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 U.S. dollars WDI 
Inflation difference Difference between foreign inflation and parent-country inflation where foreign inflation is the sum of 
foreign-country inflation rates weighted by the foreign countries’ shares in total foreign liabilities of a 
parent bank 
Bankscope and WDI 
Tourism Sum of number of tourist arrivals and departures over population of the country WDI 
FDI Sum of inward and outward flows of foreign direct investments over GDP WDI 
Openness Sum of exports and imports over GDP WDI 
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Portfolio position Sum of assets and liabilities with respect to a country’s portfolio investment position over GDP IMF IFS 
Fiscal balance Net operating balance calculated as revenues minus expenses of general government over GDP IMF GFS 
Crisis Dummy variable that equals 1 for the years 2007-2009   
Post-crisis Dummy variable that equals 1 for the years 2010-2013  
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Table 1. Summary statistics on internationalization and other variables for the period 1999-2009 
Foreign liabilities share is the sum of the liabilities of foreign subsidiary banks weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. 
Concentration is the sum of the squared shares of bank liabilities weighted by the parent bank’s ownership in a country relative to the parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all 
countries where the parent bank operates. Interest expense is interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt. Lagged profit is pre-tax profits divided by 
total assets, lagged one period. Lagged Z-score is index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/stddev(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is ratio of capital to assets, 
and stddev(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets. It is calculated for 4-years rolling windows, normalized by total assets, and lagged one period. Lagged asset volatility 
is calculated as stddev(R) ∗ (E/V), where stddev(R) is annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns, E is market value of common equity and V 
is book value of assets plus market value of common equity minus book value of common equity, lagged one period. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 
US dollars. TBTF is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank’s assets in 2000 US dollars are larger than the 90th percentile of the sample. TBTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
a bank’s liabilities over GDP is larger than the 90th percentile of the sample. Overhead is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total assets. Short-term debt is 
customer and short-term funding over total interest paying debt. Lagged tier1 ratio is the share of tier1 capital in risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks measured under the 
Basel rules, lagged one period. Deposit funding is the share of deposit funding in total liabilities. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer prices. GDP growth is the rate of real 
per capita GDP growth. World GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth at global level. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. 
Inflation difference is the difference between foreign inflation and parent-country inflation where foreign inflation is the sum of foreign-country inflation rates weighted by the 
foreign countries’ shares in total foreign liabilities of a parent bank. Tourism is total number of tourist arrivals and departures over total population. FDI is the sum of inward and 
outward flows of foreign direct investments over GDP. Openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services over GDP. Portfolio position is the sum of assets and 
liabilities regarding a country’s portfolio investment position over GDP.   
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Foreign liabilities share 3727 0.020 0.068 0 1.640 
Concentration 3725 0.966 0.090 0.271 1 
Interest expense 3727 0.033 0.024 0.000 0.289 
Lagged profit 3727 0.013 0.024 -0.437 0.293 
Lagged Z-score 1477 1.462 1.321 0.007 6.516 
Lagged asset volatility 2163 0.035 0.035 0.000 0.613 
Assets 3727 22.935 2.221 17.540 28.788 
TBTF 3727 0.102 0.303 0 1 
TBTS          3727 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Overhead 3727 0.028 0.019 0.002 0.200 
Short-term debt 3727 0.814 0.171 0 0.995 
Lagged tier1 ratio 2163 0.106 0.041 0.005 0.492 
Deposits funding 3717 0.755 0.185 0 0.995 
Inflation 3727 0.037 0.056 -0.040 0.961 
GDP growth 3727 0.021 0.030 -0.210 0.433 
World GDP growth 3727 0.012 0.020 -0.034 0.028 
GDP per capita 3727 24.983 14.583 0.154 63.475 
Inflation difference  1310 -0.007 0.083 -0.961 0.451 
Tourism 3096 0.797 1.380 0.008 14.221 
FDI 3096 0.054 0.071 0.001 1.009 
Openness 3096 0.542 0.539 0.190 4.381 
Portfolio position 3096 1.002 0.717 0.000 15.126 
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Table 2. A bank’s interest expense and its foreign liabilities 
 
The dependent variable is Interest expense, which is interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Lagged profit is pre-tax profits divided by total assets, lagged one period. Overhead is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total 
assets.  Short-term debt is ratio of customer and short-term funding over total interest paying debt. Inflation is rate of change in consumer prices. GDP growth is rate of real per 
capita GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Foreign liabilities share is the sum of the liabilities of foreign subsidiary banks 
weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. Concentration is the sum of the squared shares of bank liabilities weighted 
by the parent bank’s ownership in a country relative to the parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all countries where the parent bank operates. Lagged asset volatility is 
calculated as stddev(R) ∗ (E/V), where stddev(R) is annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns, E is market value of common equity and 
V is book value of assets plus market value of common equity minus book value of common equity, lagged one period. Lagged tier1 ratio is share of tier1 capital in risk 
weighted assets and off balance sheet risks as measured under Basel rules, lagged one period. Deposit funding is share of deposits in total liabilities. Bank and year fixed effects 
are included. Sample period is 1999-2009. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lagged profit -0.075* -0.057 -0.076* -0.939* -0.038* -0.034 -0.037* -0.924** 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.512) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.456) 
Overhead 0.265*** 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.268*** 0.070* 0.074** 0.070* 0.074** 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Short-term debt -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Inflation 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
GDP growth -0.045** -0.046** -0.046** -0.046** -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign liabilities share 0.021** 0.042**   0.012** 0.023***   
 (0.009) (0.021)   (0.005) (0.007)   
Lagged profit*Foreign liabilities share  -1.740*    -1.274*   
  (1.045)    (0.766)   
Concentration   -0.009** -0.021**   -0.010*** -0.019*** 
   (0.004) (0.009)   (0.003) (0.005) 
Lagged profit*Concentration    0.882*    0.892* 
    (0.529)    (0.457) 
Lagged asset volatility     -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Lagged tier1 ratio     -0.054** -0.055** -0.054** -0.055** 
     (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Deposit funding     0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
N 3727 3727 3725 3725 2023 2023 2023 2023 
R-sq 0.353 0.360 0.351 0.357 0.438 0.440 0.440 0.442 
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Table 3. Robustness checks for interest expense regressions 
 
The dependent variable is Interest expense, which is interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Lagged profit is pre-tax profits divided by total assets, lagged one period. Overhead is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total 
assets.  Short-term debt is ratio of customer and short-term funding to total interest paying debt. Inflation is rate of change in consumer prices. GDP growth is rate of real per 
capita GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. These control variables are included in the regressions but not reported. Foreign 
liabilities share is the sum of the liabilities of foreign subsidiary banks weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. 
Inflation difference is the difference between foreign inflation and parent-country inflation where foreign inflation is the sum of foreign-country inflation rates weighted by the 
foreign countries’ shares in total foreign liabilities of a parent bank. TBTF is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s assets in 2000 US dollars are larger than the 90th 
percentile of the sample. TBTS is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s liabilities over GDP is larger than the 90th percentile of the sample. Lagged Z-score is an index 
of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/stddev(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is ratio of capital to assets, and stddev(ROA) is the standard deviation of 
return on assets. It is calculated for 4-years rolling windows, normalized by total assets, and lagged one period. Lagged profit and Inflation difference are not reported. Bank 
and year fixed effects are included. Sample period is 1999-2009. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.   
 Inflation difference TBTF and TBTS Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign liabilities share 0.016*** 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Lagged profit*Foreign liabilities share  -0.875*  -0.905*   
  (0.491)  (0.488)   
Inflation difference*Foreign liabilities share 0.410*** 0.400*** 0.409*** 0.399*** 0.326* 0.339* 
 (0.100) (0.103) (0.101) (0.103) (0.197) (0.201) 
TBTF   0.001 0.000   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
TBTS   0.006** 0.006**   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
Lagged Z-score     -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged Z-score*Foreign liabilities share      -0.004 
      (0.005) 
N 3719 3719 3719 3719 1503 1503 
R-sq 0.381 0.382 0.383 0.384 0.355 0.356 
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Table 4. Sample split for interest expense regressions by fiscal balance and business cycle interactions  
The dependent variable is Interest expense, which is interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Lagged profit is pre-tax profits divided by total assets, lagged one period. Overhead is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total 
assets.  Short-term debt is ratio of customer and short-term funding over total interest paying debt. Inflation is rate of change in consumer prices. GDP growth is rate of real per 
capita GDP growth. World GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth at global level. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. 
These control variables are included in the regressions but not reported. Foreign liabilities share is the sum of the liabilities of foreign subsidiary banks weighted by the parent 
bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. Inflation difference is the difference between foreign inflation and parent-country inflation where 
foreign inflation is the sum of foreign-country inflation rates weighted by the foreign countries’ shares in total foreign liabilities of a parent bank. Concentration the sum of the 
squared shares of bank liabilities weighted by the parent bank’s ownership in a country relative to the parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all countries where the parent 
bank operates. In regressions 6 we require Foreign liabilities share to be less than 0.3. Fiscal balance is the net operating balance calculated as revenues minus expenses of 
general government over GDP. For regressions 1-2 and 3-4 we create two subsamples on the basis of whether fiscal balance is negative or positive. Bank and year fixed effects 
are included. Sample period is 1999-2009. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.   
 
Fiscal balance > 0 Fiscal balance < 0 Interactions with world 
GDP growth 
Foreign liabilities share 0.005  0.032***  0.020** 0.031*** 
 (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.008) (0.011) 
Inflation difference * Foreign liabilities share -0.421  0.968***  0.408*** 0.423*** 
 (0.564)  (0.362)  (0.103) (0.119) 
Concentration  -0.006  -0.026***   
   (0.005)  (0.006)   
World GDP growth * Foreign liabilities share     -0.304 -0.944** 
     (0.273) (0.403) 
N 320 321 1788 1787 3726 3688 
R-sq 0.698 0.698 0.422 0.418 0.375 0.376 
Number of banks 86 86 581 580 903 900 
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Table 5. Instrumental variable regressions of interest expense 
 
The dependent variable is Interest expense, which is interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Lagged profit is pre-tax profits divided by total assets, lagged one period. Overhead is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total assets.  Short-term debt is ratio of 
customer and short-term funding over total interest paying debt. Inflation is rate of change in consumer prices. GDP growth is rate of real per capita GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per 
capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. These control variables are included in the regressions but not reported. Foreign liabilities share is the sum of the liabilities of foreign subsidiary 
banks weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. Inflation difference is the difference between foreign inflation and parent-country 
inflation where foreign inflation is the sum of foreign-country inflation rates weighted by the foreign countries’ shares in total foreign liabilities of a parent bank. Concentration is the sum of the 
squared shares of bank liabilities weighted by the parent bank’s ownership in a country relative to the parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all countries where the parent bank operates. We 
estimate all regressions using two-step GMM with country and year fixed effects. The following instruments are used: Tourism which is the total number of tourist arrivals and departures over 
total population; FDI which is the sum of inward and outward flows of foreign direct investments over GDP; Openness which is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services over GDP; 
Portfolio position which is the sum of assets and liabilities with respect to a country’s portfolio investment position over GDP. Lagged profit and Inflation difference are not reported. We also 
report the coefficient estimates for the instrumental variables in the first stage regression for Foreign liabilities share, the p-value of the F-test of joint significance of instruments in this first stage 
regression, the p-value of the Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions, the Hausman specification error test of the difference between IV and OLS estimations as an endogeneity test, and the 
p-value of an LM test regarding the correlation of exogenous instruments with endogenous instrumented variables as a test of underidentification. Sample period is 1999-2009. Standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign liabilities share 0.094** 0.155**   
 (0.045) (0.076)   
Lagged profit*Foreign liabilities share  -4.116   
  (3.091)   
Inflation difference*Foreign liabilities share 1.175** 1.193**   
 (0.518) (0.515)   
Concentration   -0.082*** -0.114*** 
   (0.029) (0.042) 
Lagged profit*Concentration    2.179 
    (1.521) 
     
First stage regressions:     
     
Tourism 0.024** 0.022* -0.034** -0. 034 * 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) 
FDI 0.053** 0.028 -0.085** -0.055 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.037) (0.041) 
Openness 0.002 0.005 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.036) (0.036) 
Portfolio position 0.003 0.006 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Inflation difference*Tourism 0.079* 0.082*   
 (0.046) (0.045)   
Inflation difference*FDI 0.059 0.241   
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 (0.543) (0.520)   
Inflation difference*Openness -0.072 -0.079   
 (0.092) (0.093)   
Inflation difference*Portfolio position -0.055 -0.069   
 (0.061) (0.060)   
Lagged profit*Tourism  0.142  -0.073 
  (0.127)  (0.195) 
Lagged profit*FDI  2.310*  -2.478 
  (1.286)  (1.606) 
Lagged profit*Openness  -0.448**  0.401* 
  (0.205)  (0.213) 
Lagged profit*Portfolio position  -0.287  0.163 
  (0.177)  (0.138) 
N 2939 2939 2939 2939 
R-sq 0.354 0.334 0.319 0.305 
Excluded  instruments F-test  0.024 0.011 0.005 0.013 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.239 0.485 0.249 0.402 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.139 0.109 0.009 0.008 
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.049 0.019 0.078 0.110 
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Table 6. A bank’s interest expense and its foreign liabilities during the global financial crisis 
 
The dependent variable is Interest expense, which is interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt. Foreign liabilities share is the sum of the 
liabilities of foreign subsidiary banks weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 for the years 2007-2009, and is zero otherwise. Lagged profit is pre-tax profits divided by total assets, lagged one period. Inflation difference is the difference 
between foreign inflation and parent-country inflation where foreign inflation is the sum of foreign-country inflation rates weighted by the foreign countries’ shares in total 
foreign liabilities of a parent bank. Concentration is the sum of the squared shares of bank liabilities weighted by the parent bank’s ownership in a country relative to the 
parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all countries where the parent bank operates. Lagged profit and Inflation difference are not reported.  Regressions include additional 
control variables as included in the regressions in Table 2 and their interactions with the crisis variable that are not reported. Bank and year fixed effects are included. Sample 
period is 1999-2009. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Foreign liabilities share 0.011*** 0.021***   0.007 0.033**   
 (0.004) (0.008)   (0.005) (0.013)   
Crisis*Foreign liabilities share 0.007 0.012   0.001 -0.017   
 (0.007) (0.015)   (0.006) (0.014)   
Lagged profit*Foreign liabilities share  -0.808    -3.109**   
  (0.563)    (1.365)   
Crisis*Lagged profit*Foreign liabilities share  -0.380    2.174   
  (1.528)    (1.467)   
Inflation difference*Foreign liabilities share 0.369*** 0.362***   0.244 0.131   
 (0.109) (0.112)   (0.344) (0.328)   
Crisis*Inflation difference*Foreign liabilities share -0.078 -0.126   0.465 0.584   
(0.237) (0.252)   (0.519) (0.507)   
Concentration   -0.010 -0.018*   -0.009** -0.025*** 
   (0.008) (0.010)   (0.004) (0.007) 
Crisis*Concentration   0.002 -0.018*   -0.004 0.007 
   (0.013) (0.010)   (0.005) (0.008) 
Lagged profit*Concentration    0.650*    1.817** 
    (0.350)    (0.730) 
Crisis*Lagged profit*Concentration    1.415    -1.274 
    (1.247)    (0.807) 
N 3719 3719 3725 3725 2021 2021 2023 2023 
R-sq 0.381 0.382 0.351 0.357 0.440 0.442 0.440 0.442 
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Table 7. A bank’s interest expense and its foreign liabilities during the post-crisis period 
The dependent variable is Interest expense, which is interest expense over bank liabilities excluding non-interest bearing debt. Foreign liabilities share is the sum of the 
liabilities of foreign subsidiary banks weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. Post-crisis is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of 1 for the years 2010-2013, and is zero otherwise. Lagged profit is pre-tax profits divided by total assets, lagged one period. Concentration is the sum of the 
squared shares of bank liabilities weighted by the parent bank’s ownership in a country relative to the parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all countries where the parent 
bank operates. Regressions use data for the entire period of 1999-2013. Regressions 1-4 and 5-8 include additional control variables as in regressions 1-4 of Table 2 that are 
not reported. Bank and year fixed effects are included. Sample period is 1999-2013. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%.    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Foreign liabilities share 0.014** 0.030**   0.016* 0.038*   
 (0.007) (0.014)   (0.008) (0.019)   
Post-crisis*Foreign liabilities share     -0.004 -0.017   
     (0.007) (0.015)   
Lagged profit*Foreign liabilities share  -1.569**    -1.789*   
  (0.756)    (0.969)   
Post-crisis*Lagged profit*Foreign liabilities share      0.549   
      (1.357)   
Concentration   -0.006 -0.015**   -0.005 -0.016** 
   (0.004) (0.006)   (0.004) (0.008) 
Post-crisis*Concentration       0.003 -0.004 
       (0.006) (0.007) 
Lagged profit*Concentration    0.844**    0.857* 
    (0.419)    (0.447) 
Post-crisis*Lagged profit*Concentration        0.010 
        (0.040) 
N 5247 5247 5145 5145 5247 5247 5145 5145 
R-sq 0.423 0.428 0.428 0.433 0.423 0.429 0.428 0.433 
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Figure 1. Distribution of a bank’s foreign liabilities share 
This figure shows the distribution of Foreign liabilities share, which is the sum of the liabilities of foreign subsidiary 
banks weighted by the parent bank’s ownership share divided by the parent bank’s consolidated liabilities. Information 
in the figure is limited to the 1,316 observations, out of a total of 3,725 observations, with a positive Foreign liabilities 
share. Two observations with a value higher than 1 are excluded. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of a bank’s liability concentration 
This figure shows the distribution of Concentration, which is the sum of the squared shares of bank liabilities weighted 
by the parent bank’s ownership in a country relative to the parent’s bank consolidated liabilities for all countries where 
the parent bank operates. Information in the figure is limited to the 1,316 observations, out of a total of 3,725 
observations, with a Concentration of less than one, indicating some foreign liabilities. Concentration is not calculated 
for the two observations with a Foreign liabilities share value higher than one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
